
Since the overthrow of the Omar al -Bashir regime in April 2019, the first team, Abdel Fattah Al -Burhan, emerged as a pivotal figure in the Sudanese political scene, as if fate had chosen him to lead the country’s ship in a troubled sea of transformations and conflicts.
He took the leadership of the Transitional Military Council after the resignation of Lieutenant General Awad bin Auf, backed by wide support from the political forces that topped the scene at the time, as well as the support of the rapid support forces and automatic support from the army.
That stage was the beginning of a fragile and complex balance between the military and civil forces, after entering into negotiations with the forces of freedom and change (Qah) to determine the transitional phase, the tension rapidly escalated between the two parties to determine the form of the transitional phase.
However, the tension between the two parties soon escalated, especially after the dismissal of the army’s general command in June 2019, a event that sparked a storm of popular anger, but at the same time strengthened the position of proof in the political equation, as if he ascended to collapsing waves of crises.
In August 2019, the proof became head of the transitional sovereign council, trying to lead a ripped boat in a troubled sea of conflicts between conservative Islamic and secular currents related to the West.
But the winds were not always in his favor. In October 2021, he led what he called the “Path Correction Movement”, while his opponents described this as the military coup, as he toppled the government of Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdouk, strengthening his grip on power.
However, he found himself facing regional and international pressure in support of Hamdouk, which made him swing between acceptance and rejection of the international scene. Despite his dependence on the army and the rapid support forces led by Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, famous for Hamidati, internal tensions and economic and political challenges made his position look like a building from the moving sand, as he finds himself in a fragile balance between local, regional and international powers, in light of a complex political scene, and is open to several possibilities.
The major paradox is that the Rapid Support Forces, which was a major partner for proof of controlling power after the overthrow of Al -Bashir, became the greatest threat to him. After contributing to strengthening its military and political influence by supporting it in decisive events such as breaking up the sit -in and procedures for correcting the path or the military coup according to his opponents, these forces have turned into a bound enemy, where he is now fighting a war of harm against it.
More surprisingly, the folly that the Rapid Support Forces carried out in their coup attempt on April 15, 2023, and the genocide, rape, theft and destruction of infrastructure after it turned into a criminal militia, gave the proof an unprecedented opportunity to turn around it.
This popular support, which came as a reaction to the atrocities (rapid support), increased the ambition of the proof of the country’s leadership not only in the post -war period, but also in the post -transitional period.
But the question that remains suspended in the air is: What are the chances of a man to prolong this complex context? Will he be able to convert temporary popular wrapping into permanent legitimacy, or is the internal challenges, and the external will make his position as a boat struggling to stay in an unforgettable storm?
In the end, the future of the proof remains dependent on its ability to achieve an almost impossible balance between the conflicting powers, at a time when the Sudanese political scene appears as a complex chess, every movement in which it carries the possibilities of victory or defeat.
Wallpapers and circumstances of the rise of proof
The proof has reached his current position as a major figure in Sudan, where he brings together military and political authorities under turbulent and transitional conditions.
The events started with great popular protests against the rule of Bashir, which lasted for more than 30 years, as the masses demanded the overthrow of his regime; Because of economic crises and corruption.
On April 11, 2019, the Security Committee (a problem from the Minister of Defense and leaders in the army and other security services) to -ir topping the Bashir and formed a transitional military council led by the Minister of Defense, Lieutenant General Awad bin Auf, who resigned just one day after the pressure of the commander of the Rapid Support Forces and the Freedom Forces and Change that was controlling the angry street at the time.
After the resignation of Bin Auf, he assumed the proof, who was the Inspector General of the Army, the leadership of the Transitional Military Council on April 12, 2019. The proof had an estimated support within the army, and considered a relatively acceptable figure by (Rapid Support) and (Qat).
During this period, negotiations began between the military council and (Qat) to determine the form of the transitional period. However, tensions escalated after the General Command sit -in in Khartoum was dispersed on June 3, 2019, killing dozens of demonstrators and increasing pressure on the military council.
In August 2019, an agreement was reached between the Military Council and the Forces of Freedom and Change to form a transitional sovereign council consisting of 11 members (5 soldiers and 6 civilians) to lead the transitional period.
On August 21, 2019, the proof was appointed as the head of the Transitional Sovereign Council, while Abdullah Hamdouk – a civilian economist – was appointed Prime Minister.
During the transitional period, the proof was the military authority in Sudan, while Hamduk and his government took over the executive tasks. However, tensions between the military, civilians over power and the path of democratic transition continued.
On October 25, 2021, the proof led a corrective path that overthrew the transitional government after the differences within the same (I Pet) escalated, and the deterioration of the economic conditions of an unprecedented level. The proof declared the dissolution of the sovereign council and the government and imposing a state of emergency.
After this event, the proof returned to be the most prominent character in the Sudanese political scene, as he actually took power and ran the country with the help of the military, and civilian forces opposing (Qat).
In this way, the proof reached its current position as a major figure in Sudan, as it brings together military and political authorities under turbulent and transitional conditions.
A difficult budget between the political forces
The proof faces a great challenge in managing the relationship between the competing political currents in Sudan, as it tries to balance the Islamic trend and the left -wing secular current without fully committing to either of them.
The Islamic trend, represented by groups such as the National Congress Party, which was ruled during the era of Omar al -Bashir, has great organizational force and extensive experience in rule. This current, despite its decline in its influence after the overthrow of Bashir, is still trying to return to the political scene through hidden or public alliances with some military and political forces.
His experience in state management, and his ability to mobilize popular rules is making him an unavoidable player, especially in stimulating the popular resistance, which caused a big difference in the face of (rapid support) in the current war, forcing the proof to deal with it with caution to avoid provoking its rules or creating additional tensions.
On the other hand, the left-wing secular trend- represented by alliances such as the forces of freedom and change (Qat), which later turned into (progress) and then (steadfast) led by Hamduk- constitutes a pressure force on the proof to move forward in a democratic transformation process in which the Islamic trend completely isolates.
The proof tries to balance the relationship between these two currents by following a flexible policy aimed at satisfying the two parties without fully adhering to either of them.
On the one hand, he deals with the Islamic trend with reservations, as it is allowed to attend a limited presence in the political scene without giving him great influence. On the other hand, he tries to absorb some of the demands of the leftist secular current by making political promises while maintaining military control over the reins of affairs.
This flexible policy aims to avoid direct collision with any of the two currents, but it also exposes the proof of criticism from both sides, as Islamists see it hesitant in supporting them, while secularists see it as part of a military regime that hinders the democratic transformation.
In the end, the balance between these political forces remains a great challenge, as it requires accurate management of contradictory interests and avoiding the full bias of any party.
His success in this balance depends on its ability to maintain the support of the army while making limited concessions to satisfy the political forces, but any error in this equation may lead to a threat to the stability of its rule and its political future.
Since the October 2021 procedures, the proof has faced the dilemma of a political incubator to ensure that it continues in power.
Historically, the military systems in Sudan resorted to establishing loyal political entities, such as the “Socialist Union” during the era of former President Jaafar Nimeiri (1985 – 1969), but the repetition of this experience faces challenges due to the change of the nature of political forces and the chemistry of the mass mass.
Therefore, proof may resort to civil administrations, Sufi orders and businessmen, but they are forces that are unable to provide permanent legitimacy.
In light of these data, the proof remains in a fragile political situation, lacking a coherent incubator that guarantees it to continue. As for the dependence of the army on the army as a major pillar of its rule, as it provided him with protection since the overthrow of Al -Bashir, it does not represent a continuous guarantee, as the army regime does not give its commander (check on white), especially with the continued political and economic pressures.
In addition to the above, the worsening economic crisis, with the Sudanese pound decline due to the high rates of inflation, makes the survival of the proof of power more difficult. The weakness of basic services exacerbates popular congestion, and makes spontaneous protests an existing possibility.
Also, the security forces themselves may be affected by the deteriorating living conditions, which may lead to cracks within the army. In light of this situation, the proof faces two options: to make political concessions to gain economic support, or to continue to rely on self -resources, which means continuing deterioration and increasing popular anger.
However, the proof has regional support from some countries, most notably Egypt, which sees Sudan’s stability as a strategic interest for it. On the other hand, his government faces international pressure, as the United States and the European Union suspended their aid, claiming a democratic transition.
Can the proof between all these pressures by strengthening its relations with its regional allies, or making limited political concessions to restore international support?
The scenarios of the future of political proof
The proof options range from: the formation of a new political incubator by attracting traditional powers, but it faces economic and political challenges that hinder the success of this option, or respond to internal and external pressures and force it to step down, especially with the aggravation of economic conditions and possible popular demonstrations. Or splits within the army toppled it, if the differences escalate within the military institution or the negative effects escalated in the post -war stage.
In conclusion, the survival of the proof of power remains dependent on its ability to maneuver between these challenges, but it faces an unstable situation that may threaten its political future and the possibilities of stabilizing its rule.
It does not yet seem to have a clear political vision, but rather deal with crises with immediate reactions.
The opinions in the article do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al -Jazeera.