Why is Türkiye cautious about the Sharia Agreement with Qasd?

The agreement concluded between Ahmed Al -Shara, the Syrian president, came in the transitional period, and the oppressed by the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces at a positive time for Ankara, especially after the call of Abdullah Ocalan to dissolve the Kurdistan Workers Party, and therefore it welcomed it, even if its welcome is tainted with caution and anticipation.

Ankara’s priorities

For many years, Ankara’s priorities in the Syrian issue were to prevent the establishment of a political entity in the north of Syria, headed by organizations on an organic link to the Kurdistan Workers Party, and the return of the largest part of the Syrians residing on Turkish soil for Syria.

While the process of deterring aggression and the fall of the Syrian regime allowed the start of the return of the Syrians, it did not completely eliminate the idea of ​​the “Kurdish” political entity in the north, and if it weakened its chances significantly.

Quickly, Türkiye declared its red lines and priorities in “New Syria”, which it fully supported, stressing the unity of Syrian territory, the importance of stability, and rejecting retail, division and federal solutions.

Regarding the Syrian Democratic Forces (Qasqa), which Ankara sees as a Syrian extension of the Kurdistan, the Turkish official statements to deal with it have crystallized with three scenarios arranged according to priority:

The first option is to end the Syrian state, the case of Qasd, northeast of the Euphrates, by force. Otherwise, a Syrian -Syrian dialogue and through political pressure can be resolved and integrate to its forces with the army in a way that ends its independent military and political structure. Otherwise, the third option that Ankara waved for a while, and which you see, will be inevitably, will enter it militarily and directly against Qasd.

There is no doubt that Ankara prefers the options that include a complete solution to SDF and the end of its military and security control on the Syrian island, but any Syrian -Syrian solution may be acceptable by it, as a final or even phased solution, according to what was stated in the statements of more than a Turkish official.

However, the direct military solution with Turkish forces remained a permanent option for Ankara, it has repeatedly swooped it during the rule of the Assad regime as an additional station within its series of operations in northern Syria.

Also, the forces of the “Syrian National Army”, which were close to it, were removed from some areas during the process of deterring aggression. In addition to the entry of Turkish forces to the Syrian north during the Sahel crisis last week in a clear message confirming the seriousness of Ankara to block the road to exploiting the rapid developments in any direction.

Position

The agreement came in important local, regional and international contexts for Ankara, the most important of which is the call of the historical leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Abdullah Ocalan, to dissolve the party, which referred an internal political path to the Kurdish issue in Türkiye. Although the oppressor of Abdi had said that Ocalan’s call belongs to the Labor Party in Türkiye and has nothing to do with SDF, the two important developments cannot be separated from each other in any way.

The official Turkish position on the agreement was expressed in detail, in detail, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, in a television interview after his return from a recent visit to Damascus and his meeting with the Syrian Sharia and leaders, accompanied by the Minister of Defense, Yasir Golar and the head of the intelligence service Ibrahim Qalman. Where Faydan said that he does not see that the new Syrian leadership will give up regarding the issue of autonomy or self -administration, stressing that his country presented its opinion to it, and explained during the recent visit, “Our vital interests, foremost of which are the issues related to security”, and that the two sides “have the same position” on the issue in general.

Although he praised the agreement signed between the presidency and the leadership of Qasd, the Turkish Foreign Minister warned of the possibility of “future problems or mines” in the way of the solution, stressing that his country will always continue to follow developments closely, especially those related to its national security. Rather, the Minister was keen to keep the military option on the table, when he indicated that the ultimate survival of any weapon outside the framework of the state and its security and military institutions and its use outside the law and to perpetuate the occupation may make the military clash inevitable.

Cautious optimism

As expected, Ankara welcomed the agreement that achieves great gains for Syria and for it, as it proves the unity of the lands of Syria and its security and military institutions, excludes the partition scenario, and talks about integrating SDF into the institutions of the Syrian state, and about the rights of all Syrians, including the Kurds.

The agreement also came after the appeal of Ocalan and appears partially influenced by it, which could make it an additional factor contributing to the political -peaceful political solution to the Kurdish issue.

The mother signals are alsoJRakia repeated to Trump’s desire to withdraw his country’s forces from Syria, will be more strengthened after the agreement as much as it was one of his most important motives, according to Ankara.

Finally, the signing of the agreement immediately after the end of the attack on the security forces in the Syrian coast and the subsequent developments that pushing Ankara to be optimistic from the angle that it stems from the conviction of the inaccuracy and the benefit of rough solutions, and thus the need to engage in state institutions, not their hostilities.

But the Turkish welcome to the agreement seems tainted with great caution. On the one hand, the agreement did not include a direct application and specifically in terms of integrating the Qasd forces into state institutions, but rather spoke about a period of time that extends until the end of the year, which is a relatively long period in which developments can occur that lead to changing positions, as happened previously in some stations.

There is no doubt that Turkey looks closely at the directions of the Qasd leadership and does not trust them, especially what is related to relations with “Israel” and the desire to cooperate and receive support from them, as stated by Abdi himself, as well as the possibility of changing American trends towards Syria.

On the other hand, the agreement was not specified in its fourth and most important mechanism of this integration. Will the fighters as individuals or SDF will maintain its entity within the state institutions, nor dealing with the issue of centralization. This is a pivotal, not marginal, and perhaps the most important for Ankara, and what is meant by “future mines” in Fidan’s conversation. Turkey believes that complete reassurance comes only by solving a sodel permanently as a political and military project, removing non -Syrian figures, adopting local solutions exclusively, and SDF remains an existing entity – even after merging – the door keeps the door to the Naksa.

There is another source of apprehension for Ankara, which is the possibility that Ocalan’s call is mainly designed to protect and preserve Qsad as an entity and a legitimate, by withdrawing the pretext from Turkey, which takes on the slic of its organic relationship with the Labor Party, and thus its solution is a key to pressing it to not target the SDF.

This obsessive is strengthened by some leaks that spoke about Qasd’s adherence to controlling the “state prisons and its families’ prisons, and the leadership of security operations against the latter, which is the premise of the major legitimacy for SDS from an American view.

Therefore, Ankara stresses that the Syrian state is the only one assigned to hold all the basic security files, foremost of which is related to the organization of the state, and withdrawing this paper from the hand of SDF.

It also seeks in a parallel path to form a regional framework to combat the organization that works to bridge the void that the American withdrawal will leave (and Trump may be convinced of withdrawal from the beginning), which was discussed by the meeting of the neighboring countries of Syria in Amman recently.

In summary, Ankara welcomed the agreement that is supposed to be a key to unifying Syria and rejecting the partition scenarios, and launching a path to the ultimate solution of SDF, but its fears are still in place, especially related to the process of integrating it into state institutions.

Accordingly, it continues from the proximity of all developments, and on the other hand, the new Syrian leadership supports its endeavors, and on the third side it works on regional initiatives that pull the rug from under the feet of SDF, as well as it confirms that it keeps its hand on the trigger if it is necessary to end, and all the options mentioned above.