Faisal Abbas 
The US pressure on Iran recently escalated. Trump was over a short period of assuming the reins of power, noting to restore the “maximum sanctions” system, which he imposed on Iran during his first term, but more cruelly this time, so the system currently applied included the abolition of an exemption that allowed Iraq to import gas from Iran, and at the same time sought to tighten the policy of “comprehensive liquidation of Iranian oil”, by blocking gaps. Iran from evading financial sanctions, or helped it export oil to countries and allied organizations. In an interview with Fox News, at the beginning of last week, Trump revealed that he sent a message to the Iranian guide, Ali Khamenei, in which he said: “I hope you negotiate with us again to intervene militarily, which will have horrific things.” The “maximum military means” if Iran refuses to invite it to enter into a new negotiating process. In an additional escalatory step, the United States (last Wednesday), with five of its allies (the United Kingdom, France, Greece, South Korea and Panama), advanced to hold a closed security session to discuss the risks resulting from “Iran’s increase in its reserves of uranium -firm to a close level of the level required to make nuclear weapons.”
The Iranian guide did not wait for the official receipt of the American threat message, but rather responded to Trump’s media statements with counter -statements, in which he said: “President Trump’s call to negotiate with Iran is an attempt to deceive public opinion, Iran has previously negotiated with a 5+1 group, including the United States, and reached an agreement that everyone signed, but the United States is the only one that withdrew from it, and therefore we do not expect any benefit Negotiating with her again. In all cases, no one will be able to compel Iran to negotiate.
Iran is well aware that the screws began to narrow it, as the international situation is currently very different from what was prevalent when the “5+1” agreement (2015) is concluded. It is true that this agreement reduced, to some extent, Iran’s ability to fertilize uranium at modes and with quantities that enable it to manufacture nuclear weapons, but it allowed it, at the same time, a wide field of gaining nuclear knowledge and employing it in many areas, which helped it in developing its scientific and technological capabilities, including the fields of military manufacturing and space science. And because the United States was the one that decided to withdraw from it in 2018, it was natural for Iran to respond to a decomposition of some of the obligations according to which it is, especially what relates to it in the proportions of uranium enrichment, which made it transform a state of a “nuclear threshold”, which doubled the concerns of Western countries in general, and Israel in particular, although it remained committed to an agreement to prohibit the deployment of weapons. The nuclear, as a result of accepting the procedures for inspection of its nuclear reactors from the International Agency.
It is normal for Iran to refuse to enter into negotiations on issues that are by international law at the heart of its internal affairs
However, Iran finds itself in front of a big dilemma, not knowing how it faces it. It is well aware that the items included in the agenda of the new negotiations, which the United States insists on entering, will not be limited, this time, on the subject of the nuclear program, but will extend to two other topics of great importance. The first is Iran’s tester program entirely, especially what is related to the manufacture of ballistic and ballistic missiles, and the second is Iran’s regional influence, especially what is related to the relations that link Iran to actors from non -states in the region, for the item of the armament program, Iran expects that the main goal of its inclusion in the agenda of the new negotiations to discuss the possibility of reducing it, and pressing it to reduce it to the level that does not Any threat to Israel’s security is. As for the item of regional influence, Iran expects that the main goal of its inclusion in the agenda of these negotiations is to obligate it not to deal with the organizations included in the American terrorist lists, and it is intended here the Hamas movement and Islamic jihad in occupied Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Ansar Allah group (the Houthis) in Yemen, and the pledge not to extend these organizations. With money or weapons, and because these “demands” involve a clear prejudice to sovereignty, it is natural for Iran to refuse in principle to impose on it to enter into negotiations revolving around topics that international law considers at the heart of its internal affairs.
It should be noted here that the current American vision of how to deal with Iran differs from the Israeli vision, despite their identification on the need to use all available means to prevent Iran from manufacturing nuclear weapons, and to obstruct its efforts to manufacture high -tech weapons, and to carry it to cut off its prayers with anti -Israel organizations. While Trump prefers the use of economic sanctions and soft power tools means to reach these goals, without excluding the military option at a last haven, Netanyahu believes that economic sanctions and soft power tools will not help, and that the use of military power is the only way to achieve the desired targets, Ventiaho believes that the Iranian regime itself is the source of the main threat to Israel’s security, and then work should work on Driving it. Because (the Iranian regime) will not fall until after an overwhelming military strike, it opens the way for the internal opposition in Iran to move, Netanyahu believes that the time has come to take this step, especially after the deep changes that occurred in the balance of regional powers after the fall of the Bashar al -Assad regime, disintegration and collapse The Israeli Air Force on October 26, 2024, in which at least a hundred planes participated, a blow that Iran was unable to respond to, so it is not excluded that the next few months will witness unremitting attempts by Netanyahu to drag the United States to a military strike to Iran, or at least to enable him to obtain the necessary military equipment to direct this strike, after giving him the green light To do it.
Iran is expected to rely on developing its own capabilities and strengthening its relations with regional neighborhood countries
In a context like this, Iran’s options seem limited, as if it refuses to negotiate with the United States in principle, it will seem to be hiding something dangerous related to its nuclear program, which may facilitate the task of its opponents in holding it full responsibility for what may happen to it, and pave the way for them to do major military action against it, and if it agrees to negotiate under the pressure of American and Israeli threats, it will risk slipping towards the slide A trap that you may not be able to break from. To get out of this predicament, the only rational option available to it becomes acceptable to negotiate in principle, and limit it to the issue of the nuclear program, because it is the only topic that arises on Iran an international responsibility that requires it not to own or manufacture nuclear weapons, given that it is one of the parties signed on the treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons. In this case, the discussion can be limited to knowing whether Iran has violated its obligations under the Treaty of the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon, and Iran will have to focus its efforts in proving the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, which is affordable given the existence of an Iranian religious fatwa prohibiting Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons. In any case, the necessary procedures for certainty will take a long time that Iran needs to absorb the current tension shipment, and to rearrange its papers in the region. In the event that the negotiations reach an advanced stage that requires the search for a mechanism to get rid of the quantity of uranium luminous in high proportions that allow it to be used in the production of nuclear weapons, Iran will be able to bargain and request the price in the form of guarantees that force all parties, which will sign new arrangements, adhere to what it has pledged, and not to allow the repeatedness of what happened by Trump during the first state.
In parallel with this option, it is expected that Iran is interested in working to abort the attempts to harass it, by relying on the development of its own capabilities, on the one hand, and by strengthening its relations with the regional neighborhood countries, on the other hand, while providing all the incentives that encourage it to refuse to cooperate with Israel, and inform it of the dangers that may be exposed to it if it decides to extend a helping hand to this rogue state, and work Finally on activating (and developing) its strategic relations in both China and Russia, on the third side. Because the Gulf Cooperation Council countries will be the first victim of any major military strike that Iran, they must realize that the problems of the whole region have become intertwined and intertwined, and that achieving security and collective stability of this region stops first and foremost to resolve the Palestinian issue, by establishing an independent, sovereign Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.
