Abdullah Al-Haqim 
It is true that the Russian President Donald Trump’s policy shocked many, and there are good reasons for that. But back in time shows that there is a thin thread linking a number of previous American departments in its view of Russia.
Before Ukraine’s broad Russian invasion, President Joe Biden accepted negotiation with Russia on new “security engineering” in Europe. Biden did not abandon the Europeans and did not exclude them from the negotiating table, of course. But even at the time, Biden worried about the demand for dialogue with the Russians At least some Westerners. This is in addition to the fact that Biden’s words about tolerance with a “limited penetration” did not help much in building the deterrence process if it was a tongue, and if not, he expressed that hostility to Russia is not the first goal of the United States. This is confirmed by giving his administration the green light to activate the “Nord Stream 2” pipeline that was transporting Russian gas to Europe.
Former President Barack Obama was more open to the Russians. The first thing that comes to mind when Obama and Russia mentioned together is his saying to his Russian counterpart at the time Dmitry Medvedev in March 2012, when he did not know that the amplifier was working, that he would enjoy a “more flexibility” about issues such as missile defense after the elections. Medvedev asked the following President Vladimir Putin to grant him a “space” to move.
There was another moment influencing his career. In the third presidential debate with Mitt Romney in 2012, in response to the latter’s accusation that Russia is the first geopolitical threat to America, Obama said that officials “in the eighties call to ask about the restoration of their policy, because the Cold War ended 20 years ago.” The response was strong and influential, but it was wrong, with Chris Celesa’s admission of “CNN” after a contract. But in 2013, Obama regretted that Russia “sometimes slipped into … the mentality of the Cold War.” Even after the inclusion of Crimea, Obama again refused to return to a “cold war.” But the other party in that war had a different opinion.
George W. Bush did not carry this challenge to Russia during the lightning war with Georgia. Most of the measures taken by his administration were symbolic, such as sending American warships to the Black Sea for humanitarian purposes, and transferring some Georgian forces from Iraq to Georgia to participate in the fighting. Other sanctions were also weak, such as the freezing of civil nuclear cooperation between the two parties and the suspension of Russia’s request to join the World Trade Organization. However, the Russian invasion of Georgia has occurred in the last months of Bush state, so there is something to ask whether the administration is avoiding the military escalation because his visit was not loaded to the subsequent Republican candidate. In any case, Georgia also seemed to bear the responsibility of at least part of the war.
There is more
The list of American examples of cooperation with Russia is long. One of the most prominent of the Bill Clinton administration, for example, was that it convinced Ukraine to abandon its nuclear weapons in exchange for American, Russian and British guarantees to maintain its security and territorial integrity. Clinton later expressed his remorse for that step. Even his predecessor, George Bush Senior, warned Ukraine against separating from the Soviet Union in the famous “Kiev Chicken Speech” in 1991.
This universal regulation shows that Trump’s policy towards Russia is not completely cut off from the prevailing in the Washington Foundation. For example, when touching Trump’s and Obama’s Estabor to Russia, the two presidents seem to be seen from outside the “Cold War” lens. One of the basic differences in Trump’s policy with his predecessors is that he connects them in a crude manner. This does not deny that Trump may be a greater admirer by Putin’s Autocratic personality and ruling compared to his American ancestors’ view of Russia. Even when looking at previous European policies, the decisions of European leaders were not to this extent after the invasion of Crimea. Ukrainians are still awaiting a declaration of former Chancellor Angela Merkel that the opposition of Ukraine’s accession to NATO was wrong, if not moral, at least strategically. The waiting will be long.
The boundaries of the analysis
Historical comparisons do not give a fully accurate picture. Russia in the states of Clinton and Bush Jr. is different from what it was in the states of Obama and Trump (the first) and is also different from what they are in recent years. Consequently, the difference in the data that feeds the decision -making of presidents requires the production of different visions. This entails questions of the type if Obama in 2025 can take different policies from what he followed after 2014, for example. Even if he remains on the policies themselves towards Ukraine according to this assumption, it is likely that it will not deal with Europe in Trump. It is also difficult to assume that Kiev would have imposed an agreement to invest mineral resources for some guarantees.
At the same time, even with all accusations against Trump, which are not devoid of any evidence, it remains that Tone (The few) for Russia exceeds any tone that its predecessors have largely used.
Trump may seem to Lampala in Europe and Ukraine more often. This does not necessarily mean that concern about the security of Europe has eliminated most of its predecessors.
